

REMARKS

This Amendment responds to the office Action dated March 3, 2005. A diligent effort has been made to respond to all of the objections and rejections contained in the Office Action and reconsideration is respectfully requested.

A. Status of Claims

Claims 34, 40, and 46-52 remain in this application. Claims 34, 40, and 46 are amended as set forth above. New claims 53-64 are presented herein.

B. Section 112 Rejections

The Office Action sets forth several 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejections that have been overcome by the present amendment. In particular, the indefiniteness rejection pertaining to the phrase “the message attachments” in claim 34, and the written description rejection to the “and” phraseology in claim 34 have now been removed. Claim 34 was previously amended to delete the plural form of “attachments” and replace it with the singular form “attachment,” thus obviating the indefiniteness rejection. The claim has also been amended to clarify that although there are provided a plurality of attachment processing commands at the wireless mobile device, a first command that directs the host computer to transmit the message attachment to the wireless mobile communication device and a second command that directs the host computer to transmit the message attachment to an external device capable of processing the attachment, it is not required that both of these commands are transmitted to the host computer to thereby process the same attachment.

C. Claim 34 is distinguishable from Arnold

The prior version of Claim 34 was rejected over Arnold in view of Narayanaswamy. This claim, as now amended, is distinguishable from these two references. More specifically, Arnold does not disclose any of the “forwarding,” “providing,” and “transmitting” steps of claim 34, set forth above, nor does Narayanaswamy. In Arnold, the message switch 104 receives an email with an attachment, it detaches the attachment (Step 210 of Figure 2), and it then puts the attachment onto a remote web site (Step 212). The web site does not receive, store or transmit the email message anywhere, it merely stores the attachment. In place of the attachment, a pointer is provided along with the email message and is transmitted to a message recipient. The recipient can then access the attachment on the remote web site using the provided pointer.

In Arnold, however, there is no teaching of providing information regarding the identity and type of the attachment, as set forth in the “forwarding” step of claim 34. This information is important to the recipient in that it indicates the type of the attached file, and also may provide some identifier so that the user can determine how to subsequently route and/or process the attachment. In Arnold, there is no such information, and the recipient therefore is not able to determine, a priori, how to route and/or process the attachment. Arnold is also completely missing the “providing” and “transmitting” steps of claim 34. According to the claim, the user of the wireless mobile communication device is able to transmit two distinct command messages to the host computer where the message and the attachment are stored. The first command message is transmitted to the host computer to direct it to transmit the attachment to the wireless device, and the second command message is transmitted to the host computer to direct it to transmit the

attachment to an external device. Arnold teaches neither of these steps. In Arnold there is no user control over where the attachment is directed. Instead, the attachments are always sent to the remote web site for subsequent access by the recipient. The claim is thus distinguishable over Arnold.

New claims 53-58 are distinguishable from Arnold for the same reasons as claim 34. Claims 59-64 are also distinguishable from Arnold because Arnold does not disclose the claimed "plurality of command messages" for processing the message attachment, nor does it disclose the "configuration file that lists the types of attachments that can be received and processed by a wireless communication device." For at least these reasons, the claims are distinguishable over Arnold and are therefore in condition for allowance.

Respectfully submitted,

JONES DAY

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "David Cochran". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "D".

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